The President\u27s Faithful Execution Duty by Bruff, Harold H.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2016 
The President's Faithful Execution Duty 
Harold H. Bruff 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal History Commons, and 
the President/Executive Department Commons 
Citation Information 
Harold H. Bruff, The President's Faithful Execution Duty, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1107 (2016), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/6. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
8. 87.4 BRUFF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2016 9:53 AM 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF  
COLORADO LAW REVIEW 
Volume 87, Issue 4 2016 
 
THE PRESIDENT’S FAITHFUL 
EXECUTION DUTY 
HAROLD H. BRUFF* 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1107 
I.    IN WHOSE HANDS? ......................................................... 1110 
II.    WHO/WHOM? .................................................................. 1112 
III.    WITH WHOSE HELP? ...................................................... 1115 
IV.   HOW? .............................................................................. 1118 
V.   SO WHAT? ....................................................................... 1124 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Soon after our Constitution took effect, James Madison 
called the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws the 
“essence” of the office.1 A century later, even the rather 
undistinguished President Benjamin Harrison could see that it 
was the “central idea” of the office.2 But what does the duty 
mean? At a rudimentary level of separation of powers theory, 
 
 *  Professor Harold H. Bruff is the Rosenbaum Professor of Law at the 
University of Colorado Law School. 
 1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND 
HELVIDIUS ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY OF 1793, at 61 (1845). For the 
Neutrality Crisis from which this letter sprang, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Story 
of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the 
Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis 
A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 2. BENJAMIN HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS 98 (1897). See generally 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY, ch. 9 (2013). 
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every American middle schooler should know that Congress 
makes the laws, the courts interpret them, and the President 
executes them.3 This simple construct ignores the richness and 
complexity of the duty as the forty-four Presidents of the 
United States have interpreted it. This Article seeks to flesh 
out the concept. 
The text of the Constitution contains two separate but 
linked provisions to ensure that Presidents will accept and 
abide their faithful execution duty. First, at the moment of 
assuming office, each President takes the Constitution’s 
prescribed oath to “faithfully execute the Office of President” 
and to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution.4 The 
oath-taking has an indelible effect on every President—they 
often refer to it—occurring as it does either in front of the 
nation at the Capitol or somewhere else immediately after the 
shocking news of a predecessor’s death.5 Second, as Article II 
finishes enumerating the various powers of the President, it 
abjures him or her to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”6 At first glance, this may seem mere repetition for 
emphasis, and that purpose may well be present. More 
importantly, the clause in Article II extends the President’s 
responsibility beyond the conduct of his or her own office to a 
more general accountability for the actions of the subordinate 
 
 3. Alas, in 2014 only 18% of eighth grade students performed at or above the 
Proficient level in U.S. history and 23% performed at or above the Proficient level 
in civics. New Results Show Eighth-Graders’ Knowledge of U.S. History, 
Geography, and Civics, NATION’S REPORT CARD, http://www.nations 
reportcard.gov/hgc_2014/# [https://perma.cc/H3EW-VMUC]. Only 7% of eighth 
grade students were able to identify the powers of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches and demonstrate complete knowledge of the checks and balances 
among the branches. 2014 Civics Assessment: Question 228, NATION’S REPORT 
CARD, http://www.nationsreportcard.gov/hgc_2014/#/civics/question/228 [https:// 
perma.cc/9AK2-4DTX]; see also Sam Dillon, Failing Grades on Civics Exam Called 
a “Crisis,” N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/ 
education/05civics.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/ED6V-P4TG].  
 4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.  
 5. Oath-taking has a long history as a way to impose obligations. For 
example, in 1199 King John of England took a coronation oath “to observe peace 
[and to honor God] . . . ; to do good justice and equity to the people entrusted to his 
care; to keep good laws and destroy any bad laws and evil customs that had been 
introduced into the land.” DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE 
YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 141 (2003). Had King John better adhered to the oath, he 
might have avoided making the promises later extracted from him in the form of 
Magna Carta. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
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executive officers who will perform most administrative 
actions. It also stands as a warning, given the impeachment 
provision that occurs a few words later on.7 
This Article offers a framework for understanding the 
faithful execution duty that is drawn from the way our 
Presidents have understood and implemented it.8 They have 
indeed treated it as “central” and “essential” to their concept of 
the office.9 They know it provides a main standard against 
which their performance will be measured by voters and 
posterity. Certainly their understanding of the content of the 
duty has varied widely over the last two and a quarter 
centuries since Washington first took the oath in 1789. Even 
so, enough common threads appear in the historical record to 
allow us to see what the duty has come to include. 
It has been clear for a long time that the principal limit to 
presidential discretion under the duty is what “We the People” 
who govern under the Constitution and our representatives in 
Congress will accept politically at a particular time. Thus the 
duty is reciprocal: presidential behavior offers an ongoing 
interpretation of the office, and it behooves all of us to pay 
sufficient critical attention to ensure that the behavior is 
faithful in the full constitutional sense. Recall Benjamin 
Franklin’s admonition at the close of the Constitutional 
Convention to a woman who asked what the framers had 
wrought: “A republic, if you can keep it.”10 
To appraise how We and our Presidents are doing at the 
task of keeping the Republic, I invite readers to ask five 
questions about performance of the faithful execution duty. 
 
 7. Hence the resignation of Richard Nixon in the face of near-certain 
impeachment and removal for grievously failing his duties has probably braced 
his successors somewhat to their own obligations. 
 8. For a full exploration of these issues, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN 
GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION (2015) [hereinafter 
UNTRODDEN GROUND]. See also Martin S. Flaherty, Harold Bruff, Untrodden 
Ground: America’s Evolutionary Presidency, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 881 (2015) 
(book review). 
 9. Faithful execution is a central theme of UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 
8. Particular passages that are relevant to discussion in this Article are cited 
below. 
 10. EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 11 (1972). 
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I. IN WHOSE HANDS? 
Our current President, Barack Obama, once observed that 
conventional legal materials can supply most of the ingredients 
of constitutional interpretation, but that the critical last step to 
making a decision depends on what is in the interpreter’s 
“heart.”11 By this he meant that all hard interpretive decisions 
are ultimately personal in nature. Past the point where legal 
guidance runs out, decisions reflect at least five major 
ingredients: the President’s personality (which is a blend of 
character and experience), his or her political values, the 
incentives that the presidency creates, the nature of the 
controversy or crisis at hand, and the President’s awareness of 
how a proposed action fits against the precedents created by 
prior Presidents. Summing up these various influences may 
allow predictions about presidential actions with some degree 
of confidence, but plainly a range of choice, and perhaps a wide 
one, is always present. 
To see how much the personal element of interpretation 
matters, consider two pairs of Presidents. James Buchanan, a 
weak man, took a weak view of his faithful execution duty in 
the secession crisis of 1861.12 Although he believed secession 
was unconstitutional, he claimed he had no power to take 
vigorous action against seceding states. His successor, the 
immeasurably stronger Abraham Lincoln, read his powers 
broadly enough to allow him to save the Union after conducting 
a great civil war. Half a century later, the temperamentally 
aggressive Theodore Roosevelt took an expansive view of his 
powers, interpreting them to allow him to do anything not 
forbidden by the Constitution and statutes.13 His more cautious 
and lawyerly successor, William Howard Taft, thought he could 
take only actions for which affirmative authority could be 
found. 
What constrains the range of interpretation? Presidents 
weighing the imponderables of faithful execution have paid 
close attention to what their predecessors have done, because 
 
 11. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 427. 
 12. See id. at ch. 5 (for Buchanan and Lincoln). Buchanan’s weakest 
successor, Warren Harding, once abjured “personal government, individual, 
dictatorial, autocratic, or what not.” Id. at 224. Plainly, Harding was not seeking 
to expand the powers of the office. 
 13. See id. at ch. 7 (for Roosevelt and Taft). 
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no one else has faced this unique responsibility. Presidents 
have instinctively understood that the duty involves the 
practical operation of an evolving government. Hence they have 
shown little interest in original intent theories of what the 
framers expected that the duty might entail for a government 
not yet in being.14 Similarly, the episodic musings of the less 
informed judiciary, whose experience is in a separate branch, 
tend not to interest Presidents much unless they prove useful 
to quote in debate.15 As presidential precedents accumulate, 
the result is a common law of the presidency, which encourages 
incumbents to find links to what has gone before and not to 
stray too far onto untrodden ground. Stability promotes 
acceptability. 
Presidents ordinarily possess a gestalt view of the 
Constitution as a whole, as their oath implies they should do, 
instead of an approach tied closely to weaving together 
particular provisions. Compare Jefferson’s view of a restrained 
federal government relying on power mostly left with the states 
with Lincoln’s view of an indissoluble nation having 
constitutional powers adequate to pursue national ends. Thus a 
President’s politics at the most general level will inform his 
decisions, which then translates presidential values into the 
legal operation of the executive branch. Presidents who have 
reconstructed American politics (and the presidency along with 
it) have usually reached back to invoke primal values they 
associate with the nation’s founding. For example, Ronald 
Reagan claimed a “great rediscovery” of values of liberty that 
had been present in the Jeffersonian tradition from the earliest 
days.16 Lincoln drew the values of liberty and equality that he 
crystallized in the Gettysburg Address from the Declaration of 
Independence rather than the more compromised text of the 
Constitution. Thus Presidents claim legitimacy by tying new 
departures to old values in the process of leaving their personal 
stamp on American history. 
 
 14. For an explanation and endorsement of originalism for judges, see 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 15. Presidents do, however, ordinarily respect the holdings of the courts in 
particular cases, which is clearly part of their constitutional obligation.  
 16. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 360. 
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II. WHO/WHOM? 
This famous question was Lenin’s charming way of asking 
about the results of political change on the ground: who was 
going to do what to whom?17 At the apex of a more forgiving 
polity than the one Lenin commanded, American Presidents 
have still favored some groups over others in executing the law. 
Here lies an irreducible tension between the President’s role as 
head of state, which is implicit in the Constitution, and his or 
her role as head of a political party, which is ignored in the 
Constitution. 
Of course, since about the time of Andrew Jackson, 
Presidents have routinely claimed to be tribunes of the whole 
people, but that is emphatically not how they have behaved. 
Jackson himself favored small property owners over the rich, 
whites over blacks, and almost everyone over the Indians.18 
Consider whether a given President has aided management or 
labor when a disruptive strike occurs. Gilded Age Presidents 
favored the railroads over their workers; for example, Grover 
Cleveland went to extremes in breaking the Pullman strike 
late in the nineteenth century.19 But then Theodore Roosevelt 
brought the interests of workers into the mix as he mediated a 
coal strike, saying he wanted a “square deal” for all.20 Harry 
Truman was so devoted to labor that he unsuccessfully seized 
the steel mills in an effort to get workers a raise.21 At times 
presidential motivation is complex—Ronald Reagan broke an 
illegal air controller’s strike by firing the workers, saying he 
was protecting the traveling public, but his action did also 
appeal to a conservative base that disliked unions.22 
Presidents who have reconstructed American politics—
such as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and 
Reagan—have sharply shifted the who/whom relations they 
found upon taking office. Thus, like earthquakes, Presidents 
raise or lower the ground and frequently cause injuries. Even 
 
 17. See generally Michael J. Beloff, Who – Whom? Unresolved Issues in 
Judicial Review, 20 DENNING L.J. 35 (2008). 
 18. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 4. 
 19. Id. at 189–90. 
 20. Id. at 199. 
 21. See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: 
THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977). 
 22. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 530 n.15. 
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the least seismic presidencies alter the landscape somewhat, 
perhaps enduringly.23 
As Presidents have alternated between conservative or 
liberal politics over the years, one might expect most groups in 
American society to have been favored at some times and 
disfavored at others, and for many of us that would be true. 
There have been, however, two kinds of groups that have 
consistently suffered neglect or outright hostility from 
Presidents. One of them, sadly, is the downtrodden—the poor, 
powerless racial minorities (blacks and Indians especially), and 
women (at least until they won the vote in 1920). Only 
Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson have shown sustained 
attention to alleviating poverty. Yet FDR revealed great 
insensitivity to a vulnerable population when he interned 
Japanese Americans in World War II.24 Several Presidents, 
including Grover Cleveland and Herbert Hoover, have denied 
that the federal government has any power to aid the poor.25 
Many Presidents have, however, tried to alleviate the 
tribulations of the rich. 
Of course, the composition of the coalitions that elect and 
support Presidents explains much of this disappointing 
pattern. Presidents normally respond to elite groups that 
either support them or can cause trouble by opposing them in 
Congress, not to those at the fringes of society. We can only 
wish that widely held and well-justified theories that 
Presidents possess a “protective” power to come to the aid of 
citizens in distress were more often buttressed by examples of 
Presidents rushing to the aid of those who need it most.26 
Political dissenters have also suffered under presidential 
execution of the law.27 Presidents are naturally hostile to 
anyone objecting to what they are doing. Perhaps we should 
forgive suppression of dissent in the early days of the Sedition 
 
 23. This is the theme of GERHARDT, supra note 2. 
 24. See generally GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND 
THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS (2001). 
 25. In 1854 Franklin Pierce vetoed a bill granting land to build mental 
hospitals, on grounds it would imply a federal power of “public beneficence.” 
JAMES MCPHERSON, THE WAR THAT FORGED A NATION 11 (2015). 
 26. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 61–74 (1993). 
 27. This is a theme of GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME (2004). 
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Act under John Adams, on grounds that the nation was still 
adjusting to the emerging role of political parties and the rise 
of an organized opposition to the administration.28 In the 
cauldron of the Civil War, Lincoln took some actions such as 
shutting opposition newspapers that would not be considered 
acceptable today.29 Nevertheless, his overall record regarding 
civil liberties was surprisingly gentle in the context of a civil 
war, involving as it did mostly temporary detentions and few 
prosecutions for speech.30 The twentieth century was, however, 
a bad one for civil libertarians. Woodrow Wilson triggered 
widespread and unjustified prosecution and harassment of 
dissenters during and after World War I, a period that included 
the first Red Scare.31 In the second Red Scare after World War 
II, Senator McCarthy conducted his rampage with only fitful 
presidential opposition by Harry Truman and Dwight 
Eisenhower.32 There followed the illegal surveillance of 
dissident groups during the Vietnam War by Lyndon Johnson 
and Richard Nixon.33 
As the War on Terror in the early twenty-first century has 
demonstrated, modern Presidents are determined to conduct 
vigorous surveillance to detect and deter terror threats against 
the nation, without showing fine sensibilities about the civil 
liberties involved.34 This stance is clearly justifiable to an 
extent: every President’s core conception of the faithful 
execution duty is that it demands preservation of the nation. 
All else is subordinate to this primal imperative. Throughout 
our history, however, it has been easy for Presidents to 
manipulate public fears of attack in ways that increase their 
unchecked discretion. 
Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult to monitor 
presidential protection of national security. Presidents seem 
increasingly determined to look out upon the world without 
constraint while shielding their activity from anyone who 
would look in upon them, constantly asserting that secrecy 
 
 28. See id. at 29–44. 
 29. E.g., id. at 126–34. 
 30. See id. at 124–26. 
 31. See id. at 180–84, 220–26. 
 32. See id. at 323–41. 
 33. See id. at 442, 487–500. 
 34. See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE 
WAR ON TERROR, ch. 7 (2009). 
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must attend executive conduct of this “long war.” If the tradeoff 
between security and liberty is not to be overly skewed in 
executive hands, Congress and the people will need to find 
ways to monitor their Presidents and to set enduring limits to 
their discretion.35 
III. WITH WHOSE HELP? 
No President can execute the law unaided. Hence Article II 
naturally adopts the passive mood in requiring that the 
President take care that the laws be faithfully executed—
normally by the subordinate officers in whom Congress 
ordinarily vests the responsibility for administering statutes.36 
Again, the direct obligation in the oath is to faithfully execute 
the office of the presidency itself in order to preserve the 
Constitution. Reading these two provisions together, we see 
that the President’s obligation for ordinary administration is 
appropriately supervisory in nature rather than personal.37 
At once a basic managerial challenge appears. All 
principal-agent relationships involve various amounts of 
“slack,” that is, divergence between the principal’s desires and 
the agent’s actions.38 George Washington kept a close eye on 
what his small cabinet was doing, yet even he suffered from the 
difficulty of controlling headstrong personalities like Hamilton 
and Jefferson.39 As the size of an organization grows, slack 
tends to increase, in part due to the principal’s difficulty in 
gathering information about what subordinates are doing. Any 
 
 35. See generally HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: 
TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2015). Both 
this book and UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, are reviewed in Peter L. 
Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1151 (2015). 
The accountability theme is also central to both UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 
8, and PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER 
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). 
 36. For a fine analysis of statutes that grant authority directly to the 
President, see Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 
(2005). 
 37. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007); Kevin M. Stack, The 
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 
(2006). 
 38. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 
183, 206–07 (2013). 
 39. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 2. 
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modern President can envy the comparative simplicity of 
Washington’s task, considering the size of the modern 
executive with its fifteen cabinet departments, myriad other 
units, and teeming millions of agents. Harry Truman once 
lamented that he spent most of his time trying to get people to 
do what they should already be doing.40 
The President’s own tasks are threefold: he or she must 
select principal subordinates, supervise their activities, and 
dismiss them if deficient. Presidents have always had a 
daunting number of executive and judicial nominations to 
make, and they have always been constrained in making them. 
For offices involving senatorial confirmation, the appointments 
power is split by the Constitution itself, fundamentally 
compromising the prospects for a unitary and coherent 
executive establishment by adding an oversight body that may 
not accept the President’s preferences. For all presidential 
appointments, whether conditioned on confirmation or not, 
party politics tugs against presidential preferences. The 
patronage wars of the nineteenth century left Presidents 
exhausted and frustrated, struggling to control their own 
branch of government.41 Creation of the expanding civil service 
as an amelioration of patronage has produced a vast executive 
bureaucracy that Presidents often see as beyond their control 
and inert or even hostile to their policies. 
Given these political realities, how do Presidents manage 
the executive branch? Knowing the importance of having their 
own people in the posts that matter most to them, Presidents 
focus their nomination energies in three areas. First is what I 
call the “constitutional cabinet,” the four original functions of 
the executive that date from 1789: the Departments of State, 
Defense, and Treasury, and the Attorney General.42 Even 
cabinet departments outside this core receive much less 
 
 40. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
501–02, 524 (2010).  
 41. Examples include James Polk, who remarked that every appointment 
produced one ingrate and twenty enemies, UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 
113; James Garfield, who was assassinated by a disappointed office seeker, id. at 
188; and our new friend Benjamin Harrison, see GERHARDT, supra note 2, at ch. 9. 
 42. Some other units such as EPA have attained nearly comparable 
importance to modern presidents. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of 
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006). 
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presidential emphasis in the selection process. It should not 
surprise us, then, that departments such as Housing and 
Urban Development or Veterans Affairs have attenuated 
relationships to the President, and that scandal caused by lax 
supervision tends to hover near them.43 Second, ever since 
Franklin Roosevelt created the institutional presidency, 
Presidents have tried to control their own White House staff, 
which in turn tries to control the larger bureaucracy in the 
agencies. Ironically, creation of this intermediary layer 
between Presidents and department heads creates its own 
problems of slack and control, requiring substantial amounts of 
presidential time and energy. And third, Presidents focus on 
the military leadership, such as the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Civilian control of the military is a basic precept of our 
system, but it requires constant attention if it is to remain a 
fact and not an aspiration. 
Before turning to prevailing modes of presidential 
supervision of the executive, I should mention the presence and 
limited utility of the power to remove unsatisfactory officers. 
The Supreme Court has created a large and somewhat 
confused body of caselaw about this power, and scholars have 
obsessed over it for eons.44 From the President’s own 
standpoint, though, whether the power to remove a particular 
officer is constrained or unconstrained as a matter of 
constitutional law rarely matters. What does matter, as with 
nominations, is the limits imposed by politics. For example, 
Presidents Lincoln and Truman had undoubted power to 
dismiss their insubordinate generals McClellan and 
MacArthur, but both Presidents hesitated and agonized over 
the decision due to the political turmoil that would surely 
ensue.45 When Barack Obama chose his rival Hillary Clinton 
for Secretary of State, he surely knew that her political base 
made her all but unremovable. 
In practice, the removal power is split between Presidents 
and the Senate, and has been at least from the time of Andrew 
Jackson. When Jackson decided to destroy the Bank of the 
 
 43. For the VA, see Norm Ornstein, Lessons of the VA Scandal, ATLANTIC 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/the-big-
takeaways-of-the-va-scandal/372212/ [https://perma.cc/JN3N-YHW2].  
 44. See generally PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF 
POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, ch. 4 (3d ed. 2011). 
 45. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 139 (Lincoln), 273–75 (Truman). 
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United States by removing federal deposits from it, he 
discovered that his Treasury Secretary thought that to do so 
would be illegal.46 Jackson disagreed, but because the statutory 
power to move the deposits was vested in the secretary, the 
President could only remove his balky subordinate, which he 
did, and seek senatorial confirmation of a more compliant 
replacement, which was refused for a time.47 Thus the issue of 
what faithful execution means under a particular statute lies 
within the executive branch in the first instance, but has the 
potential to involve the Senate if a subordinate sufficiently 
disagrees to prompt removal and replacement. 
This point reveals an important consequence of the 
Constitution’s split allocation of the faithful execution duty—
directly to the President for the conduct of his or her own office, 
but indirectly in the role of overseeing ordinary administration. 
It is a basic precept of Anglo-American law that governmental 
authority must remain where allocated unless properly 
transferred elsewhere.48 As the episode of Jackson and the 
deposits reveals, the indirectness of the statutory part of the 
faithful execution duty both buttresses the rule of law and 
fosters the transparency of the executive branch. 
IV. HOW? 
As the episode involving Jackson and the Bank reveals, 
supervision of the executive branch is central to how any 
President actually discharges the faithful execution duty. 
Along with selecting subordinates and (sometimes) removing 
them for bad performance, Presidents issue myriad commands 
to the bureaucracy. These “executive orders” date from the 
Washington administration and have a rich history.49 
The Supreme Court set the modern legal framework for 
assessing presidential executive orders in the landmark case 
that invalidated President Truman’s order seizing the steel 
mills to stop a strike during the Korean War.50 Justice Robert 
 
 46. See id., 99–101. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the 
Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1994–97 (2015). 
 49. See generally GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL 
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2013).  
 50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also 
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Jackson’s magisterial concurring opinion identified three 
categories of presidential action: those with express or implied 
statutory authority, which are most likely to survive judicial 
review; those inconsistent with express or implied statutory 
limits, which are least likely to survive; and a middle range of 
“twilight” situations where the distribution of power is 
uncertain.51 In the Steel Seizure case, a majority of Justices 
concluded that a recent statute had denied the President the 
authority he sought to exercise. The Court correctly 
demonstrated great reluctance to hold that a President could 
exercise exclusive power that Congress could not control. Such 
a holding threatens fundamentally destabilizing our system of 
mostly shared powers.52 As Justice Jackson emphasized, even 
emergency powers should be subject to outside control if they 
are not to lead to absolutism. 
Supreme Court cases upholding exclusive executive power 
have been limited to a few matters concerning warmaking and 
foreign policy.53 For the most part, Presidents have been loath 
to claim exclusive power. Even during the Civil War, Lincoln 
submitted fully to congressional control, emphasizing that all 
his emergency actions at the outset of the war were within 
congressional powers of statutory ratification and calling 
successfully for approval to be granted.54 The contrary example 
is the disastrous presidency of Andrew Johnson, whose 
attempts to conduct Reconstruction without obeying statutes 
led to his impeachment and near removal.55 
Just as the President’s oath and the faithful execution 
clause in Article II of the Constitution refer separately to the 
President’s conduct of his or her own office and the supervision 
of subordinates who are administering statutes, some 
presidential actions are subject to much more mediation within 
the bureaucracy than others.56 Especially when an action is 
 
Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES, supra note 1, at 233. 
 51. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
 52. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 
(1996). 
 53. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 44, at chs. 5–6. A recent example is 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 54. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 132–33. 
 55. Id. at ch. 6. 
 56. Strauss, supra note 35, at 1161–64. 
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directly based on the President’s constitutional powers (such as 
disposition of the military under the commander in chief power 
or recognition of a foreign government under the foreign policy 
powers), an order may pass through the implementing 
bureaucracy like a lightning bolt, little hindered by the 
medium through which it passes. For most domestic matters, 
however, thick layers of bureaucracy and administrative law 
mediate presidential actions and can readily impede or 
frustrate them. 
Consider the nature of rulemaking by the executive 
agencies under modern American administrative law. Here a 
common complaint is that federal rulemaking has “ossified” 
under strict and burdensome requirements for extensive and 
rigorous analysis.57 These legal strictures often stem from the 
Administrative Procedure Act, to which presidential action is 
not subject.58 Executive orders, then, occupy a kind of middle 
ground: they are neither statutes nor ordinary delegated 
regulations but rather freestanding assertions of whatever 
combination of constitutional and statutory authority can be 
assembled, with the faithful execution duty as their ultimate 
justification. For unlike an ordinary administrative agency, 
Presidents can claim responsibility to oversee and harmonize 
the “mass of legislation” that empowers the executive branch.59 
The twilight zones that are so often present in statutory 
interstices give Presidents opportunities to infuse 
administration with their political values. Three examples of 
long-running presidential programs will impart the flavor of 
this activity. First, not surprisingly, it was the aggressive 
Theodore Roosevelt who initiated a surge in the use of 
executive orders that has persisted to the present.60 He made 
his strong conservationist values part of the policy of the 
federal government by issuing orders shielding large parcels of 
the federal lands from development. He had only thin statutory 
 
 57. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). But cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Why 
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 
OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009). 
 58. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 59. This argument, which was made by the dissent in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting), failed 
in that case but has more traction when statutory authority is unclear. .  
 60. DODDS, supra note 49, at 25 fig. 1. 
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authority for this practice, but the courts eventually upheld it 
on grounds that Congress was aware of it and had acquiesced 
in this presidential interpretation of the statutes.61 Second, 
after World War II, Presidents, beginning with Harry Truman, 
have issued civil rights executive orders promoting equality in 
federal employment and contracting.62 They have done so even 
in controversial realms such as affirmative action, where 
Congress had neither clearly endorsed nor forbidden these 
policies. Third, Presidents since Richard Nixon have required 
federal regulators to perform cost benefit analyses of proposed 
regulations.63 Although these regulatory management 
programs have varied somewhat in emphasis and detail, all of 
them have tried to conform the bureaucracy to presidential 
values about the relation of social costs to new regulations.64 
Congress has acquiesced in and funded these programs without 
ever endorsing them explicitly. 
Controversy about the regulatory management program 
reveals that the middle ground occupied by executive orders 
intrinsically presents issues about the legality of actions taken 
in the name of the President.65 White House intervention in 
rulemaking has at times induced agencies to exceed their 
statutory powers or to ignore the permissible fact and policy 
bases for regulations that are contained in administrative 
records.66 
Another way that executive orders communicate 
presidential values to the executive branch is by setting 
priorities for enforcing existing statutes. No President can hope 
to fully enforce every statutory requirement that exists on the 
books. There are too many laws and too few officers to make 
that a realistic prospect. Nor would the American people likely 
tolerate an attempt to enforce all laws as written. Consider 
what would happen if a city police chief decided to try to 
 
 61. Harold H. Bruff, Executive Power and the Public Lands, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 503, 509 (2005). 
 62. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 265–66. 
 63. Id. at 334. 
 64. For the evolution of this program, see SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 44, at 
486–511. 
 65. See generally Strauss, supra note 35. 
 66. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989). The problem is a continuing one. See Tummino v. 
Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
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enforce every traffic law against every violator—that is, to 
ticket every speeder, every jaywalker—the system would break 
down as processing of minor offenders foreclosed a more 
rational and acceptable policy of pursuing the most serious 
violators first, such as drunken or reckless drivers.67 
This homely example reveals that faithfulness in execution 
is not a simple criterion that more law enforcement is better 
than less. Instead, the issues are: how much enforcement, of 
what kinds, and against whom (recall the who/whom 
question).68 The ultimate goal of the best possible execution of 
the law is thus a judgment question that is deeply infused with 
political values. Resource limits force hard choices. 
Appropriations for federal agencies never allow them to do all 
that they might, and in modern times funds are often scarce 
enough to prompt laments about “hollow government”—an 
executive branch with far more responsibilities than 
resources.69 Thus Presidents not only may but must prioritize 
enforcement if they are to execute their office faithfully. 
Inattention is never an adequate exercise of any oversight 
responsibility. 
Presidential priority-setting for the agencies is often very 
difficult for Congress, the courts, and the people to oversee. A 
quiet command from the President or someone supposedly 
speaking for him can be a signal that is very hard to separate 
from the massive noise that the federal bureaucracy generates. 
Congressional oversight committees struggle to monitor 
presidential activities, but often meet the shield of executive 
privilege. Courts are generally very reluctant to review 
exercises of enforcement discretion closely, if at all.70 And both 
the traditional press and the new journals of the cybersphere 
struggle to penetrate government secrecy. 
President Barack Obama’s controversial executive order 
prioritizing immigration deportation efforts brings together 
 
 67. For the disruption potential of extreme adherence to legal requirements, 
see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809 (2015). 
 68. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 
124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015). 
 69. See generally MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, AMERICA’S HOLLOW GOVERNMENT: 
HOW WASHINGTON HAS FAILED THE PEOPLE (1992).  
 70. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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several of these issues.71 Faced with the presence of many more 
undocumented immigrants than existing enforcement 
resources could pursue, the President stated his enforcement 
priorities clearly for all to see, providing a much greater level of 
visibility than attends most law enforcement.72 For example, 
he ordered federal agents to seek out dangerous criminals 
while leaving law-abiding immigrants free to work or study for 
an indefinite period. Obama issued his order only after 
extensive legal review within the Justice Department to ensure 
that it had implied statutory authority or was at least in the 
twilight zone where no statute clearly forbade it. Litigation has 
challenged the order, but it rests on priority setting that is 
quite unsuited for judicial review.73 As with other executive 
orders, the courts may limit themselves to determining 
whether the order violates the Constitution or a statute on its 
face, without delving much into its administration.74 I think 
the order is a lawful exercise of the President’s constitutional 
power to determine priorities for faithful execution of the 
immigration statutes.75 
Presidents have traditionally interpreted the faithful 
execution duty to allow or even require that they refuse to 
enforce a statute that they regard as unconstitutional.76 Hence 
in some cases the correct amount of faithful execution is zero. 
In a famous early example, Thomas Jefferson correctly refused 
to enforce the Sedition Act of 1798 on the ground that it was a 
flagrant violation of free speech as protected by the First 
 
 71. Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution 1–2 (Ohio State Univ. Pub. Law 
Working Paper, Paper No. 300, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2637827 
[https://perma.cc/D7VB-NNQK]. 
 72. For the order’s particulars and a supporting legal analysis, see Karl R. 
Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain 
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EWF2-XWN3].  
 73. The case is Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (Jan. 19, 2016). 
 74. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 
VA. L. REV. 1, 33–41 (1982).  
 75. See Ming Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2016); see also Adam B. Cox & 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 
104 (2015). 
 76. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 63–64, 174–76. 
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Amendment.77 Similar examples have recurred throughout our 
history.78 In these cases, Presidents claim that their duty 
requires them to confront and contest one or both of the other 
branches of government. Such a confrontation is often 
necessary if a litigation to resolve the underlying constitutional 
question is to be possible. If the oath means what it says, 
Presidents must decide what they believe the Constitution 
requires of the federal government as a whole. Then the other 
branches and We the People can grapple with the issues and 
come to some resolution. 
V. SO WHAT? 
That is, having the various components of the faithful 
execution duty in mind, what effects have this aspect of the 
President’s job had on the operation of our government? For 
good or ill, Presidents have wide opportunities to take 
initiatives that will alter government policies and that will be 
difficult for either Congress or the courts to overturn. In this 
way, they put their personal stamp on their constitutional 
office. 
Presidential actions, such as executive orders, have 
encountered more political than legal jeopardy. Any order that 
receives competent legal review within the executive at the 
time of drafting is likely to survive judicial review, and most 
do. In the modern age of statutes that began with the twentieth 
century, the frequent presence of statutory gaps and 
ambiguities invites presidential touchups. Congress finds it 
difficult to overturn or modify presidential actions because of 
the power of the President’s veto, which almost always allows 
him or her to preserve the statutory status quo on which an 
order rests. Perhaps ironically (but appropriately), presidential 
actions not codified in statute are often more vulnerable to the 
differing policies of a successor than to any other threat.79 Thus 
Presidents hope that American politics will provide successors 
who will continue this contingent part of their legacy. 
In our system of three branches exercising partly 
 
 77. Id. at 63.  
 78. Shane, supra note 71. 
 79. For an example of repeated presidential reversal of predecessors, see 
UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 405–06. 
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separated powers, presidential action to ensure faithful 
execution provides flexibility that is essential to success of the 
system as a whole.80 It provides grease in our old machine of 
government, adapting its operation to the presidential politics 
of the day. In a parliamentary system like those in Great 
Britain and Australia, there is less need for such an adaptive 
mechanism because a prime minister with a working majority 
in the lower house can usually obtain legislation to do what 
American Presidents would do by executive order.81 Even when 
our Congress is not in its present state of dysfunction, 
legislating is difficult enough in the American system to make 
it beneficial for Presidents to operate in the interstices to keep 
the federal government moving forward. 
A given exercise of the faithful execution duty can be 
evaluated along a number of axes. Here are some of them. 
First, and of prime importance at the time action takes place, is 
whether it proves successful in fact and politics. In the longer 
term, the durability of particular policies across presidential 
administration matters. Retrospective assessments by scholars 
including lawyers and historians count (I hope). More 
important, though, is the attractiveness of an action to 
succeeding Presidents as part of their menu of available policy 
choices. At this juncture lies the enduring constitutional impact 
(or not) of presidential actions. 
American history provides myriad examples of presidential 
interpretations of the faithful execution duty that can either 
delight or dismay the observer. Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation stands at the apex, forging a new nation shorn of 
its gravest defect and enabled to take a new place in the 
world.82 More mundane examples of positive exercises of the 
duty include many of the conservation and civil rights 
executive orders.83 At the nadir sit actions such as Jackson’s 
Indian removal, Andrew Johnson’s conduct of Reconstruction, 
and Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime internment of Japanese 
 
 80. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 
16–20, 22–23 (2014). 
 81. “Usually” reflects the possible presence of an upper house not controlled 
by the administration, as in Australia. 
 82. For an analysis of the Proclamation as an exercise of the faithful 
execution duty, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 100 (2013). 
 83. See, e.g., DODDS, supra note 49, at 198–201, 211–12. 
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Americans.84 National remembrance of these worst moments is 
essential to prevention of their repetition. 
From time to time, a mix of presidential and congressional 
activity alters the baseline of the federal government’s role in 
American life. The largest shifts have occurred during the Civil 
War, in the New Deal, and after World War II. As the baseline 
shifts, so do the challenges presented for Presidents, Congress, 
and the people. In the twenty-first century, domestic political 
settlements dating from the New Deal and foreign policy 
settlements reached after the Vietnam War have encountered 
fundamental political challenges. In our turbulent political 
climate, no clear path to new and stable settlements appears. 
The primary current challenge to any President’s effective 
conduct of the faithful execution duty lies in managing the 
immense and secretive national security bureaucracy that is a 
legacy of World War II and the War on Terror. The public 
monitoring of executive activity that is so essential to its 
legitimacy is difficult at best and has been resisted by recent 
Presidents.85 The judgment of the framers of the Constitution 
that executive power should be vested in one person is put to 
the test by the immensity, complexity, and remoteness of our 
current government. Enduring policy will depend on the nature 
of information flows both to and from our Presidents. It is 
especially important that a flow of accurately determined facts 
and well-considered advice reaches the President before action 
is taken.86 The President then has an obligation to reveal and 
explain his or her actions sufficiently to the people to allow 
their meaningful assent to what their government is doing. 
And at the end of the day, Presidents must concede the 
capacity of statutes and public opinion to limit their actions.87 
In closing, I invite the reader to consider what the answers 
to my five questions about the faithful execution duty, taken 
together, suggest about the current state of the presidency. 
 
 84. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 93–95 (Jackson), ch. 6 (Johnson), 
252–54 (Roosevelt). 
 85. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness”?: Disclosing Intelligence to 
Congress Under Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313 (2010). 
 86. President Kennedy demonstrated both how not to manage the flow of 
advice to a President (the Bay of Pigs) and how to do so very successfully (the 
Cuban missile crisis). UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 10.  
 87. Peter M. Shane, The Presidential Statutory Stretch and the Rule of Law, 
87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231 (2016). 
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First, we have seen that the duty’s conception and 
implementation change with the personality of each President. 
Second, Presidents skew execution to favor supporters and 
routinely disfavor dissidents. Third, Presidents hold tenuous 
control of their subordinates, focusing their efforts on the most 
important officers. Fourth, the use of executive orders pushes 
the bureaucracy to implement a President’s political values, 
within statutory limits. And fifth, the discretion that the 
President necessarily possesses dampens the rigidities in our 
system. The portrait of the office that emerges contains 
elements of raw power, conflict (both political and 
institutional), constraint (both legal and practical), and, 
ultimately, great potential to benefit or harm the nation that 
all Presidents serve. As I said at the outset, the stakes are high 
and Americans must monitor their Presidents to assure that 
they discharge the duty faithfully. That is a task for us all, and 
it will last as long as our Republic endures. 
 
